

5G e Sicurezza Nazionale

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Director of CNIT
www.cnit.it



- National Inter-University Consortium for Telecommunications
(**37 Italian Universities+8 CNR research units**)
- Mission: basic and applied research and advanced education in ICT
- 1300+ researchers; **100+ own employees**
- Funding from private companies and competitive programs only:
 - H2020: 48 projects, **11 of them coordinated by CNIT**
 - 2018: 124 projects (39 EU+37 Ntl+48 Industry), 19M€; Recent results: **5 EU projects on applications of ICT; 3 EU projects on 5G ranked #1 in their calls**; 1 on cybersecurity (EU competence network); 1 on autonomous vehicles; Flagship Graphene, Flagship Quantum Information
 - Organizer of ECOC 2018 and 5G Italy 2018 and 2019 (<https://www.5gitaly.eu/>)
- No “structural” funding, a problem for overhead and labs equipment
 - e.g., Germany 30%, Spain 50%, Switzerland 50% of total budget





Currently
being deployed

Interest for
private and
temporary 5G
networks (e.g.
port, factory,
campus,
concert)

*Better performance
(speed, density, ...)*




*Diversified vertical
services*

- New usage scenarios and new (non-human users)
 - larger ecosystem, with more stakeholders, more heterogeneity
 - End-to-End, including the whole network, not only the cellular section
 - Independence between RAN and CN
 - Control and user plane separation
 - The software network
 - From a typewriter (HW) to a personal computer (SW)
 - Huge security implications!
 - Virtualization and Orchestration
 - Cloud (and edge cloud), SDN, NFV
 - Service-based Architecture in the CN
- New Radio, new spectrum, massive MIMO, ...




- **1G, 1980s, up to 2.4Kbps**: portability
 - [virtually no security]
- **2G, 1990s, up to 64Kbps** : from analog to digital, SMS, WAP
 - client authentication, encryption [Security by obscurity, no BS authentication, no core network security]
- **3G, 2000s, up to 10Mbps**: data services
 - Encryption and (in part) Integrity, mutual authentication, core network security
- **4G, 2010s up to 300Mbps** : Internet-integrated, video
 - Systematic approach, security architecture



- **5G, 2020:** new services, whole network, softwarization, cloud
 - Many (small and not-so small) tailored/chirurgic improvements
 - Proof of Presence
 - Unified Flexible Authentication / Support for multiple protocols (also non 3GPP)
 - No more transmission of IMSI (SUPI) in clear; SUCI = Public key (ECIES) encryption of SUPI
 - L2 message integrity
 - Security Edge Protection Proxy
 - Rogue base stations
 - downgrading

Elements of a 5G Security Architecture



- More realms of applications: increase in attack surface
 - Ultra Reliable and Low Latency scenarios -> more critical situations
 - IoT scenarios -> more and widespread applications, heterogeneous terminals
 - Multiplication of both types of stakeholders and numbers of tenants and third-party suppliers
 - Distribution of responsibilities also more complex
- Softwarization and slicing
 - Inherently more risky
- Signalling traffic
 - Increasing share of total; need of specific protection
- Flexible security, tailored to specific scenarios
 - Security-as-a-Service: more complex but also more powerful and effective

- Softwarization and slicing
 - Slice isolation
 - Programmability platform (e.g. P4) security
 - Network management and orchestration security-aware
 - Software modules implementing security services (e.g. monitoring)
- IoT
 - Massive coordinated IoT attacks
 - Lightweight cryptographic solutions, integrated within communication protocols
 - Multi-tenant, heterogeneous, flexible, large scale access-control
 - Scalable monitoring techniques
- New communication technologies
 - Specific security solutions for dense networks, MIMO networks
 - New (e.g. quantum) physical layer cryptographic techniques
 - Radio waves designed for security purposes

- Beyond confidentiality, integrity and availability, need to address:
 - location security (www.locus-project.eu) and privacy
 - trustworthiness of information/integrity of remote platforms
 - contextual correctness
 - proof of possession
 - support for highly limited devices such as sensors
 - tailored security at the service and device level: differentiated security services on request
 - dynamic composition of services -> modular security guarantees within the system
- Not only systems' security but also implementation security
 - Not nearly a new 5G concern → remember Greek Wiretapping case, 2004/05
 - Which approach for vulnerability assessment process?

- Network deployment
 - Investments
 - Thresholds, regulations, rules, bureaucracy and red tape (“antennas”)

- People (“engineers”)
 - 208k people aged 20-34 left Italy in the last ten years
 - Italy has the lowest percentage of people with a university degree in Europe
 - Italy has the third lowest percentage of STEM degrees in Europe





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